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This study examineswhether the inﬂuence of family ownership on R&D investment varies depending on growth
opportunities and business group membership. Using data on Korean ﬁrms over ten years (1998-2007), the
study shows that family ownership is negatively related to R&D investment, but the relationship becomes
positive when growth opportunities are present. The moderating effect, however, differs between independent
family ﬁrms and family business groups. The positive inﬂuence that growth opportunities have on promoting
R&D investment is diminished for afﬁliates of family business groups. These ﬁndings imply that family owners
invest more in R&Dwhen their family control goals are threatened by the loss of growth potential. The empirical
results of this study and its behavioral decision-makingmodel help to bridge the gap between the predictions of
the family control perspective and agency theory in explaining R&D investment by family ﬁrms in an emerging
economy.
© 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Despite the pervasiveness of family ﬁrms throughout the world, the
implications of family control for value creation through R&D are still
not completely clear (Peng & Jiang, 2009). The family control perspec-
tive presumes that family owners are primarily interested in maintain-
ing their control of their ﬁrms (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel,
Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007), and such goals may conﬂict with
emphasizing R&D investment (Morck & Yeung, 2003). In some cases,
family owners may fear that they lack the ability to handle the complex
technological problems and organizational/strategic changes that R&D
might bring (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; König, Kammerlander, &
Enders, 2013; Morck & Yeung, 2004). Family control goals are expected
to have negative effects on R&D investment in family ﬁrms (De Massis,
Frattini, & Lichtenthaler, 2013). In contrast, agency theory suggests that
although hired managers may act opportunistically by withholding
resources from long-term value-creating activities with uncertain out-
comes such as R&D (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1988; Latham & Braun, 2009),
family owners' incentives are closely aligned with the long-term value
of the ﬁrm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).5 Family owners may thus be ex-
pected to favor R&D investment that would help achieve economic
goals (Lee & O'Neill, 2003).
These two perspectives have helped to identify the distinct attri-
butes of family owners in R&D investment, but they use a one-size-
ﬁts-all approach, creating tension between whether family control
goals or economic goals drive family owners' decisions on resource allo-
cation to R&D. In contrast, the behavioral decision-making approach has
a more adaptive viewpoint. It suggests that the risk preferences of
decision makers greatly depend on their aversion to loss (Wiseman &
Gómez-Mejía, 1998). One important consideration that determines
whether family owners see themselves as in a loss or a gain position is
the gap between aspirations and performance (Cyert & March, 1963).
When ﬁrms' performance exceeds their aspirations, ﬁrms are in gain
situations and tend to avoid risky choices, but when it falls short of
their aspirations, they are in loss situations and inclined to make risky
decisions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This study follows behavioral
studies highlighting loss aversions to investigatewhether family control
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goals or economic goals motivate family owners' R&D investment
decisions (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Wiseman & Gómez-Mejía, 1998).
Among various economic goals, this study treats growth as an impor-
tant performance goal for family owners as it relates to ﬁrm survival,
the ultimate family control goal. We conjecture that the loss of growth
potential is a threat to family owners' control goals and is largely the
basis of loss aversion (cf. Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Greve, 2008;
Zellweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua, 2012). We test this conjec-
ture by investigating how family owners adjust R&D investment to
changes in growth opportunities, as those opportunities have implica-
tions for future growth potential when they are exploited by means of
R&D (David, Yoshikawa, Chari, & Rasheed, 2006; McGrath & Nerkar,
2004).
Firms operating in industries where growth opportunities are
abundant can grow faster than those in adverse environments,
but among those ﬁrms operating in such favorable environments
there are substantial variations in performance/growth depending
on their strategic actions (McDougall, Covin, Robinson, & Herron,
1994). We suggest that family ﬁrms making insufﬁcient R&D in-
vestment become less capable to exploit growth opportunities
available in an industry (McGrath & Nerkar, 2004). It represents
nonconformity with growing environments (Zajac, Kraatz, &
Bresser, 2000), which likely causes problems in actual and relative
growth potential in the industry and consequently may become a
threat to long-term family control goals particularly if it continues.
In contrast, competitors investing in R&D may be in an advanta-
geous position to exploit growth opportunities and as a result
grow fast, surpassing those ﬁrms less capable to do so. As ﬁrms
consider peers and competitors when forming their aspirations
(Cyert & March, 1963), some ﬁrms in growing industries may be
in a position of loss if growth opportunities remain unexploited.
Therefore, we expect that family ownership encourages R&D in-
vestment in the presence of growth opportunities, as family
owners who own a larger share of their ﬁrms have greater motiva-
tion to achieve growth and protect their family control goals.
However, the value of R&D in low growth environments tends to
be uncertain (Oriani & Sobrero, 2008). In such situations, cutting
back on R&D may be a viable strategic choice, as family control
goals may be unthreatened.
The relationship between family ownership and R&D investments
mentioned above may differ in situations where family control is better
protected, such as in afﬁliates of business groups. Business groups can
better protect family control because they can subsidize afﬁliates
(Chang & Hong, 2000; George & Kabir, 2008; Khanna & Rivkin, 2006)
and thus contain many afﬁliated ﬁrms that are family controlled. In
such contexts, family control and economic goals may severely collide
and the convergence of those goals motivated by loss aversion may be
delayed. Subsidies by business groupsmay compensate for the relative-
ly feeble growth potential associated with insufﬁcient R&D in growing
industries. In turn, this may limit R&D investments necessary to exploit
growth opportunities by individual afﬁliates.
These ideas can be efﬁciently tested in the context of South
Korea, where ownership and control are highly integrated in fam-
ily ﬁrms, and business groups are prevalent. Therefore, data on
publicly listed Korean ﬁrms are used to search for inﬂuences of
family ownership on R&D investment and to uncover how they
might differ for family ﬁrms belonging to business groups. The
ﬁndings of this study further clarify the nature of family owners'
inﬂuence on R&D investment. Unlike the family control and agency
theory arguments, our ﬁndings suggest that family owners' inﬂu-
ence on innovation investment varies depending on the presence
of growth opportunities, and that business group membership is
an important boundary condition for the relationship. These ﬁnd-
ings imply that family owners behave like value-conscious owners
when their control goals are threatened due to the potential loss of
economic goals such as ﬁrm growth.
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses
2.1. Family owners and R&D investment
Research on family business6 demonstrates that family owners who
control aﬁrm'smanagement are salient in both developed and develop-
ing countries where corporate control by the markets is weak (Aguilera
& Jackson, 2003; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). They
often install a family member as CEO or in another senior management
position (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). These family owners have non-
ﬁnancial motives, such as a need for belonging, preservation of family
wealth, dynastic continuity, and family social status (Gómez-Mejía
et al., 2007; Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008). Preserving family control of
the ﬁrm is usually the primary goal among their non-ﬁnancial values,
as only in this way can the family continue to pursue its interests
through the ﬁrm (Kim & Gao, 2013; Zellweger et al., 2012).
Family owners may be tempted to discourage R&D investments to
emphasize family control goals. Often this occurs because they do not
feel well equipped to deal with complex technology issues (Morck &
Yeung, 2004). If so, they may ﬁnd it desirable to limit the ﬁrm to apply-
ing technologies that family members themselves can understand.
Beyond that, successful R&D often requires new arrangements and
new routines. Such changes and experiments may be perceived as a
threat to a family's control of their ﬁrm. Instead, family owners may
prefer to emphasize alternative ways to maintain and expand their
businesses, such as political lobbying (Morck & Yeung, 2003). Invest-
ment aversion may also arise from long-standing relationships that
ensure the selection of ofﬁcers who are beholden to the family or to a
particular group closely related to the family owners (Schulze,
Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001). The majority of empirical studies
(De Massis et al., 2013) investigating the relationship between family
ownership and R&D investment report a negative relationship between
the two in Canada (Morck, Stangeland, & Yeung, 2000; Muñoz-Bullón &
Sanchez-Bueno, 2011), Europe (Munari, Oriani, & Sobrero, 2010;
Sirmon, Arregle, Hitt, & Webb, 2008), Taiwan (Chen & Hsu, 2009), and
the U.S. (Block, 2012).
At the same time, agency theorists predict that management by a
controlling shareholder should often correlate with greater ﬁrm value
because the owners' interests are well aligned with increasing the
value of the ﬁrm. Such shareholders can alleviate the agency problems
involved with hired managers and encourage the pursuit of long-term
investments, such as R&D (Berle & Means, 1932; Berrone, Surroca, &
Tribo, 2007; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). These are sensible arguments,
but little empirical evidence supports the prediction that family ﬁrms
should favor investment in innovation as a means of promoting long-
term survival and growth. Instead, a few studies suggest that family
owners promote R&D investment only under certain conditions. For ex-
ample, Chrisman and Patel (2012) investigate manufacturing ﬁrms in
the U.S. and report that the inﬂuence of family owners on R&D varies
depending on the gap between aspiration and performance.
2.2. Growth opportunities and family owners' inﬂuence on R&D investment
Decisionmakers in behavioral studies are postulated to change their
risk preferences depending on their loss or gain position, which is inﬂu-
enced by the gap between aspirations and performance (Cyert &March,
1963; Greve, 2003). Prior research extensively examined this behavioral
decision-making thesis in a variety of settings, such as R&D investment
and ﬁnancial markets (Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, & Chuang, 2005; Greve,
2003). By applying this logic, this study focuses (among various perfor-
mance facets) on growth, as it is a dominant performance goal for family
owners (Grossman, 1993; Kim & Gao, 2013; Zellweger et al., 2012).
6 As this study focused on family ﬁrms, “independent ﬁrms” refers to family ﬁrms that
are not members of any business group, and “business groups” refers to family business
groups.
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Growth is essential for ﬁrm survival, a prerequisite for family owners'
long-term control goals (cf. Greve, 2008). In industrial economics and
organizational ecology studies, it is an established fact that a ﬁrm's
survival likelihood increases with its size and age (Audretsch, 1995;
Jovanovic, 1982). However, as the effect of these factors (especially ini-
tial size) decreases over time, aﬁrm's growth rate becomesmore impor-
tant in shaping its chances of survival (Agarwal, 1997;Mata, Portugal, &
Guimaraes, 1995). Hence, enhancing growth potential is conducive to
survival and thus consistent with family owners' interest in long-term
control goals (cf. Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Greve, 2008; Zellweger
et al., 2012), indicating that family owners' inﬂuence on R&D invest-
ment may rely on their judgment of the loss of growth potential.
In an effort to examine this relationship, we focus on how family
owners adjust their inﬂuence on R&D investment according to growth
opportunities. In growing industries, ﬁrms are likely to be performing
well and growing faster thanwhen theywould operate in adverse envi-
ronments. However, even in such favorable environments, ﬁrms'
performance signiﬁcantly varies depending on their strategic actions.
Growing business environments generally involve technological chang-
es and favor an aggressive strategic posture (McDougall et al., 1994),
such as R&D and product development activities (Audretsch, 2004;
Covin & Slevin, 1988; Del Monte & Papagni, 2003). Similarly, many em-
pirical studies support the view that growth opportunities are call op-
tions whose values depend on the discretionary investments made by
a ﬁrm (David et al., 2006;Wright, Ferris, Sarin, & Awasthi, 1996). For ex-
ample, McGrath and Nerkar (2004) show that investment in R&D helps
exploit opportunities resulting from industry growth and as a result can
have greater upside than downside potential. Further, R&D investments
by ﬁrms with promising growth opportunities lead to an increase in
market valuation (Szewczyk, Tsetsekos, & Zantout, 1996). As R&D in-
vestment implies a ﬁrm's capacity to exploit growth opportunities
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; McGrath & Nerkar, 2004), we posit that re-
ducing R&D investment in growing environments represents misﬁt
and makes ﬁrms less capable to exploit growth opportunities available
in the industry.
The relationship described above suggests that ﬁrms should adjust
their investments to ﬁt the business environment. Misﬁt has a detri-
mental performance effect, threatening ﬁrm survival in the long run.
Zajac et al. (2000) empirically show that in the U.S., savings and loans
industry organizations that deviated from the predicted strategic ﬁt ex-
perienced signiﬁcant negative performance consequences. Other stud-
ies report that ﬁrms exhibiting misﬁt between their strategies and
environments generate lower returns on assets than those ﬁrms with
better ﬁt (Burton, Lauridsen, & Obel, 2002). Insufﬁcient R&D investment
in a growing industry is a prime example of misﬁt that can lead to lim-
ited growth potential and greater risk of failure, particularly if growth
continues to be restrained (McDougall et al., 1994). The threat to main-
taining family owners' long-term control goals is particularly severe
when competitors are growing faster than the focal family ﬁrms as a re-
sult of aligning their innovation activities with the growing industry's
requirements. A widening gap in growth potential in comparison with
industry competitors strongly implies a decline in the market power
of family ﬁrms in future competition (Cool & Dierickx, 1993). Hence,
ﬁrms in growing industries may still need R&D investment to exploit
any available growth opportunities so as to keep up with not only
their own internal expectations, but also those of their industry compet-
itors (Baum et al., 2005; Cyert & March, 1963). As suggested above, if
family ﬁrms make insufﬁcient R&D investment in growing industries
and thus lag behind their competitors, they might ﬁnd themselves in a
position of loss rather than of gain with respect to growth potential
and long-term family control goals. The behavioral decision-making ap-
proach predicts that this situation encourages family control goals and
economic goals to converge, increasing R&D investment (cf. Chrisman
& Patel, 2012; Wiseman & Gómez-Mejía, 1998). Greve (2008) shows
that when ﬁrms are below the aspiration level for size, they attempt
to grow more.
The discussion presented so far indicates that family owners may
make investments in R&D when facing growth opportunities; other-
wise, they may experience loss in both growth potential and long-
term family control goals. This inclination is greater for family owners
who hold larger shares, as they might be more interested in preserving
family control from threats caused by limited growth potential. Howev-
er, in low-growth environments there is no strong evidence for a
positive relationship between R&D and growth potential. R&D in such
environments may take more time to bear fruit and entail greater
risks. Hence, R&D investment may be not an efﬁcient approach to ﬁnd-
ing a betterﬁt in low-growth environments, inwhich family owners are
unlikely to ﬁnd themselves in a loss position andwould discourage R&D
investment. This is particularly true for family owners who own a large
share of their ﬁrms. Thus,
Hypothesis 1. Industry growth opportunities moderate the relation-
ship between family ownership and R&D investment in a way that the
relationship becomes positive.
2.3. Business group membership and the effect of growth opportunities on
R&D investment
The idea that limited growth potential damages family owners'
ability to maintain family control goals and likely puts them in a loss
position may depend on the condition that inﬂuences the extent to
which family control is protected. One such condition is the business
group organizational form. As family control is well protected in
business groups, the growth problems caused by inadequate R&D in-
vestmentmay give little threat to the family owners of business groups.
A business group is a set of legally independent companies (afﬁli-
ates) that are governed by the same controlling owner. Family owners
are often inclined to form a business group to reduce ﬁrm-speciﬁc
risks (Amihud & Lev, 1981). They seek to create internal factor markets,
which they hope will be more efﬁcient than external markets, particu-
larly in less-developed economies where external product, ﬁnancial,
and labor markets remain immature (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Khanna
& Palepu, 2000). In many emerging economies, such as in Korea, con-
trolling owners exercise almost full control over all of the afﬁliated
ﬁrms through extensive ownership and other ties among the afﬁliates
(Joh, 2003; Kim, Hoskisson, Tihanyi, & Hong, 2004). Business groups
are also often involvedwith the investment decisions and resource allo-
cations of each afﬁliate (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Khanna & Palepu, 2000;
Kim et al., 2004; Rajan, Servaes, & Zingales, 2000).
As family owners create or acquire more afﬁliates, forming a larger
business group, they are more likely to view the arrangement as favor-
able for their family control goals. The literature on business groups sug-
gests that family control goals are better protected in the business group
structure than in the independent ﬁrm structure. In business groups,
family control is usually strengthened through pyramidal and/or
cross-shareholding ownership structures,whichuse indirect ownership
to exert control over the ﬁrms belonging to the group (Almeida, Park,
Subrahmanyam, & Wolfenzon, 2011). Prior studies also suggest that
business groups focus primarily on stable performance, believing it con-
ducive to group survival. For example, failure of an afﬁliate could have a
serious detrimental effect on the reputation, survival, and consequently
family control of the entire group (Ferris, Kim, & Kitsabunnarat, 2003).
Hence, business groups tend to support troubled afﬁliates by moving
funds from other strong afﬁliates. This substantially reduces the loss of
family control goals, which is supposedlymotivated by business failure,
compared to when they were an independent ﬁrm. Thus, business
groups often engage in cross-subsidization to help unproﬁtable afﬁliates
(Bae, Kang, & Kim, 2002; Ferris et al., 2003; George & Kabir, 2008;
Whited, 2001) by, for example, providing loans or loan guarantees,
through equity investment, and through internal transactions (Estrin,
Poukliakova, & Shapiro, 2009; Friedman, Johnson, & Mitton, 2003).
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In Hypothesis 1, we argue that neglecting R&D in a growing industry
will raise a family owner's concern about future growth potential vis-à-
vis their competitors, i.e., threats to family control, which put family
owners in a position of loss rather than of gain. However, any such
relationship will be weaker in the family business group context. The
negative consequence of restraining R&D investmentmay be less severe
and more easily mitigated in business groups than in independent
ﬁrms. In business group structures, insufﬁcient R&D in an afﬁliate is
less likely to threaten family owners in business groups, failing to
prompt family owners to invest in R&Dwhen the industry offers growth
opportunities. Thus,
Hypothesis 2. Business group afﬁliation moderates the joint effect
of industry growth opportunities and family ownership on R&D invest-
ment in a way that the joint effect becomes negative.
3. Methods
3.1. Sample
South Korea provides an ideal context for testing these hypotheses
because family owners are so prevalent (Nam, 2004) and well-known
to strongly inﬂuence their ﬁrms' business decisions (Jang & Kim, 2002;
Solomon, Solomon, & Park, 2002). This study focuses on family con-
trolled manufacturing companies that were listed on the Korea Stock
Exchange from 1998 to 2007. Family controlled ﬁrms are those in
which ownership and management are concentrated within a family
unit (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007; Litz, 1995), speciﬁcally
where the controlling shareholder and/or his or her family, by either
blood or marriage, hold 5% or more of the ﬁrm's equity and at least
one of them is the CEO, president, chairman, vice-president, or a regis-
tered board member (cf. Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Villalonga
& Amit, 2006). The controlling shareholder of a ﬁrm in Korea is deﬁned
in Korea's Securities and Exchange Act as a person or entity that owns or
controls theﬁrm.Heor she is usually the largest shareholder. After elim-
inating observationswith incomplete information about R&D spending,
this classiﬁcation yielded 2136 ﬁrm-year observations (an unbalanced
panel; 298 ﬁrms). The data were collected from the Korea Investors
Service database, which contains company proﬁles, ownership informa-
tion, and ﬁnancial data for all publicly listed Korean ﬁrms.
3.2. Measures
The dependent variable, R&D intensity, was measured annually as
the ratio of a ﬁrm's R&D expenditure to its total sales (David et al.,
2006).
Consistent with prior studies (Chang, 2003), family ownership was
quantiﬁed as the ratio of the common shares of a family ﬁrm held by
the largest shareholder and other entities having a special relationship
with the shareholder, which usually included family members and
afﬁliated ﬁrms (Bae et al., 2002; Chang, 2003). Afﬁliates' ownership
was included in family ownership, as afﬁliates in the Korean context
are owned and controlled by the business group's family and thus
similar to divisions in diversiﬁed corporations (Chang, 2003; Chang &
Choi, 1988).
Growth opportunitywas calculated as the average three-year annual
growth rate of sales in each industry deﬁned at the two-digit SIC level,
which was assumed to reﬂect the growth trajectory of the industry in
which a ﬁrm participated. Industry growth rate is widely used as an
indicator of market attractiveness (Datta, Guthrie, & Wright, 2005;
Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995; McDougall et al., 1994; Wernerfelt &
Montgomery, 1986).
Business group afﬁliationwas represented by a dummy variable with
the value of one, if the ﬁrm was a member of one of the large business
groups identiﬁed in the Korean Fair Trade Commission's (KFTC's)
annual listing, and zero otherwise (Chang & Hong, 2000). The KFTC de-
ﬁnes a business group as a set of companies that are governed by the
same shareholder or a company that is afﬁliated with the shareholder
in terms of ownership (more than30%) or actual control (e.g., the ability
to unilaterally select the CEO). The number of business groups listed
changed over the sampling period because the Korean government re-
vised its policy on business groups during that period. Before 2002,
large business groups were selected based on the total asset size, but af-
terwards regulationwas applied based on speciﬁc policy purposes, such
as limiting cross-shareholding and total shareholding, and different
asset sizes were applied. Despite these policy changes, the list of large
business groups was built around the 30 largest groups. Using a
dummy variable to represent business group afﬁliation is consistent
with the methods of previous studies (Chang, Chung, & Mahmood,
2006), but it did not capture the fact that many independent ﬁrms
also establish a small group of afﬁliates. The arguments about large
business groups may also be applicable to such small groups. To check
robustness, the number of total afﬁliates for each sample ﬁrm in each
year was collected from each ﬁrm's annual report and included in the
analysis.
The analyses also incorporated several control variables related to
ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors that could inﬂuence R&D intensity. Firm size was
represented by the logarithm of each ﬁrm's total sales in each year.
Firm age was calculated as the difference between the current year
and the founding year reported by the ﬁrm. The log value of ﬁrm age
was used in the analyses. The availability of cash resources was mea-
sured by operating cash ﬂow, deﬁned as the cash ﬂow generated from
operating activities, after deducting interest and taxes (but before cash
dividends), divided by each year's total sales. A ﬁrm's return on assets
was also included, measured as net income divided by total assets.
The debt ratio was measured as total debts divided by total assets. Year
dummies and industry dummies were also included to control any
year-speciﬁc and industry-speciﬁc effects.
3.3. Analysis
Ordinary least squares (OLS) may provide biased estimates for such
panel data because of unobservable heterogeneity in ﬁrm characteris-
tics. Fixed-effects estimation addresses unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity
as long as the errors are independent and homoscedastic. However,
these conditions are rarely met in panel data (Davidson & MacKinnon,
1993). To deal with these difﬁculties, generalized estimating equations
(GEEs) were evaluated to test the hypotheses. This method accounts
for any within-subject correlations, avoiding spurious results arising
from ﬁrst-order autoregressive correlations (Ahuja & Katila, 2001;
Liang & Zeger, 1986). Furthermore, GEE models are known to provide
robust variance estimates that account for heteroscedasticity and unob-
served differences among ﬁrms (Henderson, Miller, & Hambrick, 2006).
OLS and ﬁxed-effects estimation methods were also used in the robust-
ness checks. Endogeneity in the relationship between family ownership
and R&D investment is a great concern.We havemade several efforts to
alleviate this concern. For example, a lagged dependent variable was
maintained as a control variable. The growth opportunity variable de-
ﬁned in this study is rather exogenous, as it reﬂects the average sales
growth of industries rather than individual ﬁrms' capabilities. Further,
family ownership and R&D investment may be inﬂuenced by a third
omitted variable. To account for this concern, the dynamic panel gener-
alized method of moments (GMM) estimation was performed. This
method is known to address the concern of biases due to potential
omitted variables (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Greene, 2003).
4. Results
Descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix describing the data
are presented in Table 1. Although most of the correlation coefﬁcients
are low, the dependent variable and its lagged version are closely
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correlated, as are ﬁrm size and business group afﬁliation/total afﬁliates.
To reduce the potential effect of these high correlations on the estimates,
the variables were mean-centered before creating the interaction terms,
which reduced the correlations substantially. The impact of collinearity
was investigated using a variance inﬂation factor (VIF) for each variable
in the OLS regressions corresponding to the estimation models
appearing in Table 2. All of the variables, including the three-way
interactions, show acceptable VIFs. For example, in Model 6 (OLS) of
Table 2, the mean VIF value of the variables is 1.67, ranging from 1.09
to 2.39. Further, the highly correlated total afﬁliates and business group
membership variables are not entered in the same regression equation.
Thus, multicollinearity is not a serious problem in the analyses.
Table 2 presents the coefﬁcients of the estimations. Model 1 exam-
ines the effects of the control variables. The results show that R&D
Table 1
Descriptive statistics and correlations.
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. R&D intensity 0.010 0.023 1.000
2. R&D intensity (t − 1) 0.010 0.022 0.784 1.000
3. Firm size (log) 0.119 0.012 0.003 0.002 1.000
4. Firm age (log) 3.556 0.350 −0.066 −0.099 0.252 1.000
5. Operating cash ﬂow 0.059 0.105 0.008 −0.057 0.149 −0.022 1.000
6. ROA 0.031 0.081 0.041 0.034 0.139 −0.054 0.371 1.000
7. Debt ratio 0.439 0.194 −0.110 −0.100 0.114 −0.010 −0.251 −0.437 1.000
8. Business group afﬁliation 0.134 0.341 0.004 0.005 0.644 0.200 0.075 0.051 0.084 1.000
9. Growth opportunitya 0.157 0.132 0.191 0.148 −0.102 −0.211 0.028 0.007 −0.037 −0.090 1.000
10. Family ownershipa 0.343 0.182 −0.137 −0.104 0.045 0.060 0.080 0.134 −0.178 0.093 −0.210 1.000
11. Total afﬁliatesa 7.943 8.585 0.045 0.041 0.585 0.153 0.086 0.041 0.037 0.663 −0.030 0.061
Correlation coefﬁcients greater than 0.045 are signiﬁcant at the p ≤ 0.05 level of conﬁdence (two-tailed).
a These variables were used in interaction terms and were centered in the analysis to reduce potential multicollinearity.
Table 2
Coefﬁcients of the estimations predicting R&D intensity.a,b.
Dependent variable: R&D intensity Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
GEE OLS Fixed effects Dynamic GMM
Constant 0.014*
(0.006)
0.015**
(0.006)
0.019***
(0.006)
0.019***
(0.006)
0.011*
(0.005)
0.012**
(0.004)
0.029
(0.024)
R&D intensity (t − 1) 0.352***
(0.014)
0.355***
(0.014)
0.359***
(0.014)
0.361***
(0.014)
0.687***
(0.017)
0.509***
(0.012)
0.179***
(0.015)
0.146***
(0.034)
Firm size (log) 0.098**
(0.039)
0.091*
(0.038)
0.051
(0.039)
0.045
(0.038)
0.066†
(0.035)
0.022
(0.028)
0.075
(0.083)
−0.444
(0.810)
Firm age (log) −0.004***
(0.001)
−0.004***
(0.001)
−0.004***
(0.001)
−0.004***
(0.001)
−0.004***
(0.001)
−0.002**
(0.001)
−0.008
(0.007)
−0.001
(0.002)
Operating cash ﬂow −0.003
(0.003)
−0.003
(0.003)
−0.003
(0.003)
−0.003
(0.003)
0.002
(0.004)
−0.008**
(0.003)
0.000
(0.002)
0.039***
(0.008)
ROA 0.000
(0.003)
0.000
(0.003)
0.000
(0.003)
−0.001
(0.003)
0.004
(0.005)
0.001
(0.003)
0.000
(0.003)
−0.129***
(0.018)
Debt ratio −0.006**
(0.002)
−0.006***
(0.002)
−0.006***
(0.002)
−0.006**
(0.002)
−0.003
(0.002)
−0.005***
(0.002)
−0.003
(0.002)
−0.122***
(0.020)
Business group (BG) 0.002
(0.001)
0.002
(0.001)
0.004**
(0.001)
0.004**
(0.001)
0.004***
(0.001)
0.003
(0.003)
−0.054
(0.045)
Family ownership (FO) −0.003†
(0.002)
−0.002
(0.002)
0.000
(0.002)
0.000
(0.002)
0.002
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)
−0.001
(0.002)
−0.004
(0.011)
Growth opportunity (GO) 0.010**
(0.004)
0.011***
(0.004)
0.011**
(0.004)
0.011**
(0.004)
0.010*
(0.005)
0.008*
(0.003)
0.007**
(0.003)
0.082***
(0.017)
FO ∗ GO [Hypothesis 1] 0.042***
(0.011)
0.039***
(0.011)
0.049***
(0.012)
0.052***
(0.016)
0.048***
(0.011)
0.027**
(0.011)
0.555***
(0.098)
FO ∗ BG −0.016***
(0.005)
−0.022***
(0.005)
−0.019***
(0.004)
−0.007
(0.006)
0.060
(0.066)
GO ∗ BG 0.013
(0.009)
0.012
(0.008)
0.021**
(0.007)
0.006
(0.008)
−0.034
(0.073)
FO ∗ GO ∗ BG [Hypothesis 2] −0.126**
(0.041)
−0.108***
(0.034)
−0.087*
(0.039)
−0.804**
(0.295)
Total afﬁliates 0.000
(0.001)
FO ∗ total afﬁliates −0.005*
(0.002)
GO ∗ total afﬁliates −0.003
(0.004)
FO ∗ GO ∗ total afﬁliates −0.052**
(0.019)
Industry dummies Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Year dummies Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Wald's Chi-squared (F) 1560*** 1628*** 1725*** 1789*** 3212*** 85.75*** 8.97*** 4322***
Firm-years 2136 2136 2136 2136 1997 2155 2136 2181
Groups 298 298 298 298 281 298 318
† Indicates signiﬁcance at the p ≤ 0.10 (*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001) level of conﬁdence (two-tailed); Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
a All of the variables entered on the right-hand side of each equation have a one-year time lag, except for the year and industry dummies.
b The continuous variables entered into the interaction terms were centered to reduce potential multicollinearity.
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intensity is autocorrelated and also correlated with debt, family owner-
ship, and growth opportunity. Hypothesis 1 suggests that growth
opportunity and family ownership are jointly related to R&D intensity.
In Model 2, the estimated coefﬁcient of the interaction term is signiﬁ-
cant and positive (0.042, p ≤ 0.001). This result strongly supports
Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2 posits that the interaction between family ownership
and growth opportunity is negatively moderated by business group af-
ﬁliation. The three-way interaction model, Model 4, tests this hypothe-
sis. The coefﬁcient of the family ownership and growth opportunity
interaction term is signiﬁcant and positive inModels 2 and 3, but the co-
efﬁcient of the three-way interaction relating family ownership, growth
opportunity, and business group afﬁliation is negative (−0.126,
p≤ 0.01) inModel 4. These results suggest that family owners promote
R&D in the presence of growth opportunity signiﬁcantly more in inde-
pendent family ﬁrms than in business group afﬁliates. Hypothesis 2 is
thus supported. Overall, the models explain a signiﬁcant proportion of
the variance in R&D intensity. The adjusted R2 for Model 6 (OLS) is
0.63, which explains more than half of the variance in R&D intensity of
the sample ﬁrms.
To better understand the speciﬁc moderating effects, interaction
plots were prepared using the procedure recommended by Cohen and
Cohen (1983). One standard deviation below and above the mean was
taken as the range for the variables in the interaction terms, and the
other variables were held at their mean values. Fig. 1 shows that the
positive joint relationship of family ownership and growth opportunity
with R&D intensity is much stronger when family ownership is high
than when it is low, which supports Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2 proposes that the relationship between family owner-
ship, growth opportunity, and R&D intensity depicted in Fig. 1 should be
weaker for business group afﬁliates. Fig. 2 shows that for independent
ﬁrms, the patterns (lines 2 and 4) of the relationship are the same as
in Fig. 1. However, lines 1 and 3 in Fig. 2 demonstrate that the joint in-
ﬂuence of family ownership and growth opportunity on R&D intensity
is negative in business group afﬁliates, and it becomes evenmore nega-
tivewhen the proportion of family ownership is greater. These negative
relationships between family ownership, growth opportunity, and R&D
investment are consistent with the idea that business group owners
may not perceive threats from cutting back on R&D when there are
growth opportunities. Thus, the relationships depicted in Fig. 2 support
Hypothesis 2.
The results appear to be insensitive to the alternative measures, to
additional control variables, and to the estimation method used.
Model 5 uses the number of afﬁliates instead of the dichotomous
dummy variable of business group afﬁliation, showing that as the num-
ber of a ﬁrm's afﬁliate increases, the positive interaction effect of family
ownership and growth opportunity is attenuated. In Model 5, the
coefﬁcient of the term representing the interaction of family ownership
and growth opportunity is positive and signiﬁcant (0.052, p ≤ 0.001),
but it becomes negative (−0.052, p≤ 0.01) as the number of total afﬁl-
iates increases. Further, the OLS (Model 6), ﬁxed-effects (Model 7), and
dynamic GMM(Model 8) estimations all return consistent results. Anal-
yses with additional control variables such as capital investment, a
dummy variable indicating the policy change in 2002, other afﬁliates'
average R&D intensity, and analysis using alternativemeasures of family
ownership (raising the ownership portion of the family from 5% to 10%
and 15% of the total shares) all returned results that concur with Model
4 in Table 2. These results are not shown, but are available from the
authors on request.
5. Discussion
Debate persists about the effect of family ownership on ﬁrms' R&D
investment. The results of this study using data from publicly listed
Korean corporations suggest that the inﬂuence of family ownership on
R&D investment is positively moderated by growth opportunities, but
this relationship is not the same in allﬁrms. That is, the inﬂuence of fam-
ily owners exploiting growth opportunities through R&D investment is
weaker in large family business groups where family control is more
secure.
By approaching the issue from a behavioral decision-making per-
spective, this study argues that neither the family control perspective
nor agency theory alone can effectively explain the inﬂuence of family
ownership on R&D investment. Focusing on the deterministic view of
these perspectives is likely to fail to adequately capture the subtleties
of the effect of family ownership on innovation in ﬁrms facing different
levels of industry growth and different organizational environments,
such as business group afﬁliation. The results of this study help to bridge
the gap between the predictions of the family control perspective and
agency theory, at least for the ﬁrms studied. Chrisman and Patel
(2012) showed that family ﬁrms promote R&D investment more than
nonfamily ﬁrms when their ﬁrms' performance is below aspirations.
Our results obtained by investigating R&D investment within family
ﬁrms supplement theirs by highlighting that ﬁrms with a high propor-
tion of family ownership promote R&Dwhen external growth opportu-
nities are perceived. The results support the loss aversion perspective
with respect to family ﬁrms (Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999; James,
1999; Zellweger & Nason, 2008). Our results are particularly usefulFig. 1. Interaction of family ownership with growth opportunity and R&D intensity.
Fig. 2. Interaction of family ownership, growth opportunity, business group afﬁliation, and
R&D intensity.
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because they point out that family inﬂuence on ﬁrm innovation may be
balanced by family owners' concerns about the loss of family control
due to potential growth problems and eventual threats to ﬁrm survival.
The research model used in this study offers a dynamic view that helps
explain family owners' preferences in different contexts based on loss
aversion and is more amenable to the pursuit of growth (Greve, 2008).
This study also helps to explain the effect of the frequently observed
behavior of family owners in the context of business groups. The results
indicate that family control goals converge with economic goals less
often for ﬁrms in family business groups. This ﬁnding is particularly in-
teresting because it is not explained by prior studies that highlight other
attributes of business group afﬁliation. For example, published research
reports thatmore diversiﬁed ﬁrms have an appropriability advantage in
their technological efforts (Argyres & Silverman, 2004). Business group
afﬁliates may gain similar beneﬁts from group membership because
they can obtain more complementary resources from and achieve syn-
ergy with their afﬁliates (Chang & Hong, 2000; Chang et al., 2006;
Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). These advantages of business groups, particu-
larly their ability to share technical knowledge and ﬁnancial resources
with their afﬁliates, helped business group afﬁliates outperform inde-
pendent ﬁrms in Korea during the early 1990s in terms of patents
ﬁled (Chang et al., 2006). This logic predicts that the controlling share-
holders of business groups should invest more in R&D than those of
independent ﬁrms because they anticipate better returns. However,
this study shows that the positive interaction of family ownership and
growth opportunity with R&D investment can be signiﬁcantly attenuat-
ed in family business groups. Despite growth opportunities, family
owners may not view business groups' underinvestment in R&D as a
loss position because their control goal is not strongly dependent on
the performance of individual afﬁliates. This behavioral explanation
clariﬁes why family owners belonging to business groups may appear
insensitive to growth opportunities in contrast to the owners of
independent family ﬁrms.
The results underscore the need to address principal–principal con-
ﬂict problems in business groups (Hambrick, Werder, & Zajac, 2008).
For example, Brush and his colleagues show that managers of family
owned businesses search more diligently for growth opportunities
and strive to achieve the best possible performancewith internal capital
(Brush, Bromiley, & Hendrickx, 2000). However, this behavior may not
hold in business group afﬁliates (particularly in the case of internal
growth through R&D), as our results indicate that family owners
belonging to family-controlled business groups may not be strongly
inﬂuenced by growth opportunities when making discretionary R&D
investments. This pattern of investment behavior in business groups
may also occurwith respect to the use of ﬁnancial slack. Kim and his col-
leagues show that family ownership positively moderates the relation-
ship between ﬁnancial slack and R&D investment in Korean ﬁrms (Kim,
Kim, & Lee, 2008), but this effect may be weakened when business
group afﬁliation is considered.
The ﬁndings of this study may have implications for the positive re-
lationship postulated in agency theory between insider ownership and
R&D investment/risk taking (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Hill & Snell, 1988;
Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993). Although the traditional view of
agency theory suggests a positive inﬂuence of insider ownership on
risk taking, some studies focusing on the insiders' wealth concentration
suggest that an increase in insider ownership may lead to a negative ef-
fect on risk taking. They argue that if a signiﬁcant portion of an insider's
wealth is concentrated in a single company (as is the case with insiders
holding substantial equity), the insider may ﬁnd it undesirable to in-
crease risk taking with respect to that company (Wright et al., 1996).
Scholars also suggest that for the wealth concentration effect to be real-
ized, it needs another condition, i.e., entrenchment. If insiders avoid
growth-oriented risk taking, theymay face the loss of their employment
unless they are entrenched, for example, with a substantially high level
of ownership (Demsetz, 1983; Gibbs, 1993). Together, these arguments
suggest an inverted U-shaped relationship between insider ownership
and risk-taking or ﬁrm value (Wright, Kroll, Krug, & Pettus, 2007). The
ﬁndings of the present study imply that this invertedU-shaped relation-
ship may occur when inside shareholders increase or decrease R&D in-
vestment in response to varied levels of growth opportunities. For
example, insiders' concern over wealth concentration may slow down
(expedite) the speed atwhich they increase (decrease) R&D in response
to the presence (lack) of growth opportunities.
5.1. Limitations and future research
Care must of course be taken in generalizing any ﬁndings derived
entirely from Korean companies. Family shareholders' behavior may
vary depending on the context in which their decisions are made,
such as the timeperiod and the country (Peng, 2003). For example, fam-
ily shareholders may have behaved differently before and after the
Asian ﬁnancial crisis in 1997/1998 because they may have faced differ-
ent risks or have become more responsive to foreign and local capital
suppliers after the crisis. Institutional changes can also alter the context
in which decisions are made (Choi, Yoshikawa, Zahra, & Han, 2014).
While the investigation of Korean companies offers a point of reference
for future studies, emerging economies are particularly heterogeneous
in their institutional, historical, and cultural backgrounds. Future re-
search in different national contexts would give better insight into the
inﬂuence of family owners and conditions such as business groupmem-
bership. In addition, our ﬁndings may have implications for ﬁrms that
are not family controlled but have multiple business divisions or
segments. Such conglomerates tend to have a market value less than
that of dominant single-segment ﬁrms (Rajan et al., 2000; Singh,
Nejadmalayeri, & Mathur, 2007), though some studies (e.g., Villalonga,
2004) have shown a diversiﬁcation premium. It is worth investigating
whether or not U.S. conglomerates emulate Korean business groups in
their R&D investment decisions in response to growth opportunities,
and if their behavior is linked to their diversiﬁcation discounts or
premiums.
This studydid not includeﬁrms inwhich the founderworked as a se-
nior manager but no other family members were involved (Miller, Le
Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella, 2007). Such lone founders are
known to be more entrepreneurial and growth oriented than other
types of family owners (Block, 2012; Miller, Le Breton‐Miller, & Lester,
2011; Miller et al., 2007). One might thus conjecture that lone-
founder ﬁrms may not show aversion to R&D investment and may be
signiﬁcantly different from other family ﬁrms in capturing industry
growth opportunities through R&D investment. Future studies might
fruitfully compare how lone-founder ﬁrms and other family ﬁrms differ
in creating and exploiting technological opportunities.
Family owners may inﬂuence not only the intensity of R&D invest-
ment but also where those investments are made. For example, family
owners may persuade afﬁliates to pursue projects that have greater
overlaps with those of other afﬁliates to create synergy and wealth for
the group as a whole. An analysis of the nature of R&D investments at
the project level and of innovation outputs (e.g., patents) would further
extend our understanding of how family ownership affects innovation
by independent family ﬁrms and group afﬁliates.
The ﬁeld may also beneﬁt from investigating the speciﬁc control
mechanisms that business groups use, such as a group headquarters, ﬁ-
nance companies, and cash ﬂow control (cf. Lu & Yao, 2006). Such
mechanisms may elucidate how principal–principal conﬂict can lead
to tunneling and propping. For example, Lu and Yao (2006) have ob-
served that a ﬁnance company belonging to a business group takes re-
sponsibility for managing cash ﬂows among the afﬁliated companies
and allocates and redistributes funds for new projects or acquisitions.
It may thus be easier for family shareholders to ﬁnd ways to fund R&D
projects in underperforming afﬁliates when the business group has a ﬁ-
nance company. The ﬁnding that the family owners of business groups
with more afﬁliates show more principal–principal conﬂict over R&D
investments also indicates that business groups differ in terms of the
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control mechanisms that they use, and that this heterogeneity may be
closely related to the size of the group.
6. Conclusions
The inﬂuence of family ownership on R&D investment has been an
emerging issue in family business and innovation research. This issue
becomes even more complex with the realization that family owners
may behave differently in different organizational forms. The analyses
presented here indicate that the effect of family ownership on R&D in-
vestment may be not ﬁxed but may change depending on the presence
of growth opportunities and business group membership. This ﬁnding
implies that family owners invest more in R&D when their family con-
trol goals are threatened by the loss of growth potential. The behavioral
perspective helps to explain the complicated behavior of family owners
with respect to R&D investment.Wehope that these resultswill encour-
age future research on these complex but important issues.
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